中小企业小额贷款英文文献及翻译 第3页
Loan guarantees
Costs of default and benefits to small firms
Test from: Allan L. Ridinga，George HainesJR. Loan guarantees－Costs of default and benefits to small firms[J]，Carleon University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada Abstract
Governments of most countries seek to encourage Small and Medium Sized Enterprise ( SME) growth and the job creation that many believe is fostered by such growth. Substantive growth usually requires expansion capital. It is often perceived that compared with larger firms, SMEs face disproportionately less access to the debt capital they need for start-up, growth, and survival. Consequently, governments and trade associations have often intervened in credit markets by taking on the role of guarantor of loans that financial institutions advance to SMEs. For example, the Small Business Administration in the United States provides guarantees of loans made by banks to qualifying small firms. Similar schemes are in effect in, among other countries, Canada, Japan, the U.K., Korea, and Germany. Trade associations take on such roles in France, Spain, and other nations. 本文来自优.文'论^文·网
Loans hat support the expansion of small enterprises may convey significant benefits to the borrowing firms and, through job creation and retention, to the rest of society. However, to the extent that some borrowers are unable to meet the repayment obligations of their debt, guarantors also face material real costs of honoring their guarantee to the lenders. Loan guarantee programs are designed in a variety of ways. This paper draws on empirical evidence to compare costs with benefits. In addition, it uses the results and economic theory to provide some guidance for the design of loan guarantee programs. Finally, the study shows that loan guarantee programs can be an effective means of supporting start-up, growth, and survival of new and risky enterprises.
The paper reviews previous attempts to conduct cost-benefit analyses of loan guarantee programs. It finds wide variation, internationally, in default rates. Published data suggests default rates vary from less than 5% (Germany) to more than 40% (U.K.). The empirical analysis reported here focuses on the Canadian implementation of loan guarantees, the Small Business Loans Act (SBLA). Findings include (1) loan guarantees granted under the terms of the SBLA provide an extremely efficient means of job creation, with very low estimated costs per job; (2) default rates are higher for newer firms, increase with the amount of funds borrowed, and vary widely by sector.(3) the widening eligibility to larger firms and to larger loans may not be well advised and is inconsistent with the goals of the program. Moreover, reducing the loan ceiling would arguably discourage fraudulent applications while servicing those SMEs most in need of early-stage capital.
In addition, analysis of the lenders' motives suggests that default rates on the portfolio of guaranteed loans and, therefore, the costs of honoring guarantees, are particularly sensitive to the level of the guarantee. Small reductions in the level of the guarantee (for example, guaranteeing 80% of principal and accrued interest instead of 85%) could lead to substantial reductions in default rates.
1 Introduction
For policy makers and entrepreneurship researchers, a far-reaching research finding of the late twentieth century was that a disproportionate amount of job creation is attributable to the growth of SMEs. Consequently, governments of most countries seek to foster SME growth. Many perceive this growth to be obstructed by imperfections in the credit market. The flaws cited are such that smaller firms obtain disproportionately less access to the debt capital needed for start-up, growth, and survival. Governments have, therefore, often intervened in credit markets by using loan guarantee programs. However, notes that loan guarantee programs are often designed in an ad-hoc manner and in a variety of ways that do not reflect guidance from economic theory or experience. Therefore, this paper reports on an attempt to draw from empirical evidence and economic theory t毕业论文
http://www.youerw.com o guide the design of loan guarantee programs. The paper opens with a short description of the generic features of loan guarantee programs and describes the agency relationship between the guarantor and delivery agents. The paper then illustrates variations in design and outcomes by describing loan guarantee programs of the United States, Canada, and the UK. This is followed by a more detailed description of the Canadian Small Business Loans Act (SBLA).
The next section presents empirical findings of the analysis of costs and benefits of the SBLA and identifies empirical relationships between the default rate on guaranteed loans and program parameters. The paper closes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the design of loan guarantee programs and shows theoretically why the rate of default is highly sensitive to the proportion of loan that is guaranteed.
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