中小企业小额贷款英文文献及翻译 第6页
5 UK: The DTI Loan Guarantee Scheme
The loan guarantee scheme(LGS)was introduced in 1981 following the recommendations of the Wilson Committee (1979) that “competition between banks … was insufficiently effective to ensure that viable small businesses always had the necessary access to sufficient funds on reasonable terms.” The scheme is a joint venture between the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and lenders such that guarantees are restricted to firms that have tried and failed to obtain a loan. Lenders must satisfy themselves that they would have offered conventional loans but for the lack of collateral or track record and that all available personal assets have been used for conventional loans. On acceptance, the DTI provides the lender with a guarantee for 85% of the total loan. In return for government backing, the borrower must pay the DTI an annual premium. In addition, the lender may require a pledge of real assets as security and will usually take a fixed or floating charge on such assets. 毕业论文
http://www.youerw.comAs noted by Pieda (1992), the default rates of LGS loans is of the order of 40% for loans granted between June 1981 through March 1984. For loans granted from October 1988 through September 1989, 30% had defaulted within the first two years. Moreover, the majority of defaults occur within the first two years, indicating potential flaws in the credit decision-making procedure. Defaults were also more common among those firms that used the guarantee to finance working capital, a result to be expected: The use of long-term obligations to finance short-term assets contravenes long-standing financial wisdom.
First, the UK approach involves the guarantor in the loan approval step, at least in name. This is time consuming, costly, and at variance with the idea that commercial lenders are best equipped to make credit decisions. In Canada, the decision is left exclusively to the lender, relying to a greater extent on the expertise that the banking sector can contribute. Second, the level of guarantee may have a dramatic impact on default rates. For the period during which the default rates in the United States were measured, the level of the guarantee had been set at 90%. Third, the level of fees can arguably affect the quality of borrower drawn to the program. If the fees are too high, good quality borrowers will not use the program, and the cycle of market deterioration described by Akerlof (1970) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) can result. 本文来自优.文'论^文·网
Higher default rates are not, in themselves, negative indications. What is important is the degree to which social welfare benefits exceed the subsidy implicit in the costs of the program. In the United States, Rhyne (1988) estimated this subsidy at 11 to 13%. However, as Vogel and Adams (1997) observe, no rigorous assessment of social welfare benefits has been conducted in either the United States, the UK, or Canada. Hence, any statements must be qualified. However, it is clear that the hurdles to positive assessments are greater in the UK and in the United States than in Canada.
Other countries have schemes designed to facilitate SME financing through loan guarantees. In the Netherlands and Germany, governments fund guarantees for business loans. Organizations external to government, including trade associations, provide loan guarantees in Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, and Greece. In Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia, a variety of institutional arrangements provide for loan guarantees. The operating policies and details of programs differ considerably across jurisdictions, yet little theory-based or empirical research exists to guide program design.
6 Previous Research: Loan Guarantees
Vogel and Adams (1997) present a critical review and analysis of the rationales advanced in support of loan guarantee programs. They note that:
1. the design of loan guarantee programs does not logically reflect assumptions about credit market imperfections;
2. all loan guarantee programs involve subsidies;
3. most evaluations report only a portion of the costs of the program
4. research cannot measure accurately “additionality.”
Vogel and Adams point out that credit market imperfections do not provide a valid rationale for loan guarantee programs, yet they identify two circumstances under which small firms may face disproportionate difficulty obtaining debt capital, situations that loan guarantees may address.
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