Abstract:Internal control regulation effectiveness remains controversial given the recent financial crisis. To address this issue we examine the financial reporting effects of the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) internal control provisions. Exemptions from these provisions for banks with assets under $500 million and for non-U.S. banks provides two unaffected control samples. Our difference in differences method suggests that FDICIA-mandated internal control requirements increased loan-loss provision validity, earnings persistence and cash-flow predictability, and reduced benchmark-beating and accounting conservatism for affected versus unaffected banks. More pronounced effects in interim versus fourth quarters suggests that greater auditor presence substitutes for internal control regulation.本文来自优.文~论^文·网原文请找腾讯752018766
1. Introduction
Internal control systems have long been advocated as a mechanism for establishing high quality financial reporting, and firms have voluntarily used them for this purpos论文网http://www.youerw.com/
论文范文http://www.chuibin.com/ e. In response to several high-profile financial frauds, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) issued their Internal Control - Integrated Framework in September 1992. This report provided a foundation for assessing internal control effectiveness. Since then, several waves of accounting scandals have led to regulatory requirements for managers and auditors to report on internal control effectiveness. Most recently, the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) internal control provisions have fueled the ongoing debate among regulators and practitioners about the effectiveness of this type of regulation in improving financial reporting quality given the subsequent financial crisis. In a speech delivered at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Global Capital Markets Summit, James Turley (2008), Chairman and CEO of Ernst Young, calls for “a global debate about what management should be saying about its controls, (and) what auditors should be saying about them, if anything.”
Supporters of internal controls regulation argue that limiting managerial discretion improves financial reporting quality. While potentially true for firms with material internal control weaknesses, limiting managerial discretion may not improve financial reporting, on average, for all regulated firms and could potentially reduce financial reporting informativeness. For example, Bagnoli and Watts (2005) show that managers with discretion to report conservatively can signal their private information about the probability of good future prospects. Essential to resolving this argument is 2485