本文的其余部分安排如下。——在下一节中,我们提供了对实施我们的实证分析非常重要的制度特征的信息,并提供详细描述的数据。经验方法和结果分别在第3节和第4节中给出并进行讨论。 在第5节中,我们提出了一个简单的理论框架来指导我们的实证结果的解释,我们将关键模型假设与巴西国情现实联系起来。 最后,我们将在第6节给出一些结论。
外文文献出处:Bastos P, Straume O R. Preschool Education in Brazil[J]. 2016
附外文文献原文
Summary. — Expanding access to preschool education is a particularly important policy issue in developing countries, where enrollment rates are generally much lower, and where private institutions constitute a much larger share of the formal preschool sector, than in developed countries. This paper examines if an expansion in the supply of public preschool crowds-out private enrollment using rich data for municipalities in Brazil from 2000 to 2006, where federal transfers to local governments change discontinuously with given population thresholds.
Results from a regression-discontinuity design reveal that larger federal transfers lead to a significant expansion of local public preschool services, but show no evidence of crowding-out of private enrollment, nor of negative impacts on the quality of private providers. This finding is consistent with a theory in which households differ in willingness-to-pay for preschool services, and private suppliers optimally adjust prices in response to an expansion of lower-quality, free-of-charge public supply. In the context of the model, the absence of crowding-out effects of more public preschool providers can be rationalized by the existence of relatively large differences in willingness-to-pay for preschool services across different demand segments. Our theoretical and empirical findings therefore suggest that in developing country settings characterized by relatively high income inequality, an expansion in public preschool supply will likely significantly increase enrollment among the poorest segments of society, and need not have adverse effects on the quantity or quality of local private supply.
Key words — preschool education, private and public provision, crowding-out
1. INTRODUCTION
Public policies aimed at increasing access to formal preschool education are high on the political agenda in a number of countries. There are probably two main reasons for this. First, a higher supply of formal preschool education is by many seen as a crucial tool for achieving higher (female) participation rates in the labor market. Second, there is now a sizable body of evidence for both developed and developing countries indicating that there are important long-term inpidual and public benefits to enrollment in preschool education.
Access to formal child care is a particularly important policy issue in developing countries, where enrollment rates are generally much lower, and where private institutions constitute a much larger share of the formal preschool sector, than in developed countries. The generally low and uneven access to preschool education is arguably reflected in the observation of large disparities in cognitive development at the start of primary school in many developing countries. For example, Paxson and Schady, 2007 and Schady et al., 2015 document a widening gap in cognitive development between poor and non-poor children in several Latin American nations. After entering primary school, the gap tends to remain constant. Why do these gaps emerge and why do they stop growing? In light of the previously cited studies, a possible explanation lies in the differences in opportunities available—in particular, access to formal child care—to poor and non-poor children in their early years.
In order to remedy such problems, an available policy option is to increase the public supply of (free or widely affordable) preschool education. The intended effects of such a policy are twofold: (i) to provide more equitable access and (ii) to increase the total supply of formal child care. However, the successfulness of such a policy depends crucially on the extent to which increased public supply crowds out existing private supply, which in turn depends on how private preschool providers respond strategically to increased competition from public providers. Do private providers respond by lowering their prices and competing more aggressively in all market segments? Or do they react by increasingly targeting higher-income households that do not find public providers attractive? If an expansion in free-of-charge public supply simply induces households to switch from high-quality private suppliers to lower-quality public centers, negative impacts on child development cannot be excluded.